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ORACLE V. GOOGLE: SETTING A STANDARD OR HANDICAPPING AN 
INDUSTRY? 
Tyler J. Demasky* 
For years the world of software programming has been 
operating under the assumption that both the declaration code and 
the structure, sequence, and organization (SSO) of Java 
application program interfaces (APIs) were not copyrightable and 
were therefore free for all to use. However, when Oracle sued 
Google in 2014 for Google’s use of Java APIs in the Android 
Operating System (OS), the Federal Circuit held that the 
declaration code and the SSO of APIs are protected by copyright, 
and remanded the case back to the district court. The jury found in 
favor of Google—who had to rely on a “fair use” defense—and 
Oracle again appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit 
should affirm the jury’s verdict because the district court’s 
interpretation of the statutory factors align more closely with the 
nature of software programming. Further, reversing the jury’s 
verdict could potentially set a negative, restrictive precedent and 
have detrimental effects on the software industry. 
  
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018. The author 
would like to thank all of the JOLT V.18 editors, but especially his Notes Editor, 
Nick Hanna, and his Editor-In-Chief, Shannon O’Neil. He would also like to 
thank Jeffrey Kaufman and Scott Peterson of Red Hat, Inc. for assisting the 
author in his understanding of the software technology presented in this article. 
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The law often has to play catch-up with modern changes in 
society. This catch-up is perhaps most prominent in intellectual 
property and technology. However, the Federal Circuit1 has a 
chance to bridge the gap. In 2010, Oracle sued Google for 
copyright infringement of Java “application program interfaces” 
(“APIs”) owned by Oracle in Google’s Android operating system 
                                                
1 See infra Part IV. Section B. explaining the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. 
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(“OS”).2 The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court 
to be retried on the basis that APIs are copyrightable,3 where 
Google successfully defended its use of APIs under the “fair use” 
doctrine.4 
Oracle has again appealed to the Federal Circuit,5 and the court 
will consider a potentially significant and impactful decision. 
Upholding the jury verdict could potentially set a new, more liberal 
test for “fair use” when dealing with software programming,6 
which in turn could help lessen the gap between law and 
technology. Reversing the decision could have the opposite effect, 
resulting in more stringent copyright laws and debilitating 
innovation for an entire industry. 
This Recent Development examines the implications of a 
Federal Circuit ruling by proceeding in six parts. Part II provides 
an overview of the “fair use” doctrine and its historical 
interpretations. Part III introduces and explains Java, Java APIs, 
and how copyright law attaches to the literal and non-literal 
elements of APIs. Part IV addresses the history of the case, both 
inside and outside of court. Part V first analyzes the current verdict 
and addresses why the district court’s verdict should be affirmed. It 
then assesses what reversing the verdict could mean legally, and 
how that might affect the software industry in particular. Finally, 
Part VI concludes by reiterating the possible consequences of 
Oracle’s appeal to the Federal Circuit on the cloudy area of 
software copyright law. 
                                                
 2 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
 3 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 4 See Final Judgment, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-10-03561 WHA 
(N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016). 
 5 See Notice of Appeal to the Fed. Cir. by Oracle Am., Inc., docket number 
3:10-cv-03561, entry # 2071, filed on 10/26/2016. 
 6 See infra Part V. Section A.1. 
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II. HISTORICAL “FAIR USE” 
According to the Copyright Act of 1976, determining whether 
use of a work is “fair use” involves the consideration of several 
factors, including the following: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes (“purpose”); 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work (“nature”); 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole (“amount”); 
and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work (“market effect”).7 
While the Copyright Act lays out these four factors, it does not 
define them.8 Defining the factors, or even contributing additional 
factors, is left to the courts.9 It is “an equitable rule of reason,”10 
meaning that results may vary, causing some to refer to the “fair 
use” defense as “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law 
of copyright.”11 Different courts may weigh factors differently, and 
some courts may even weigh factors differently from case to 
case.12 This section discusses “fair use” by focusing on: (A) the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of fair use in Sony Corporation of 
                                                
 7 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Final Charge to the Jury (Phase One) & Special Verdict Form, at 12, 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-10-03561 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 8, 
2016) (“[T]he statute includes several examples of some types of uses that may 
be found to be fair uses, but that list is not exhaustive or exclusive.”) [hereinafter 
Final Charge]. 
 10 Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)). An equitable rule of reason 
means that the doctrine is fact based, and an accurate application of the doctrine 
requires a case-by-case analysis. See id. 
 11 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 12 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-
51, 454-55 (1984); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-68; Sega Enters. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-27 (9th 1992). 
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America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.13 and Harper & Row, 
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,14 and (B) the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit’s (“Ninth Circuit”) application of Supreme 
Court guidance in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.15 
A. The Supreme Court’s “Fair Use” Interpretations 
In Sony Corporation of America,16 the Supreme Court held that 
Sony’s Betamax17 tapings of previously broadcasted television 
programming constituted fair use, putting the emphasis most 
heavily on the first statutory factor (purpose), followed 
respectively by the fourth (market effect), and third (amount).18 
Sony produced and sold Betamax, a home video tape recorder, 
which allowed customers to record television programs.19 
Universal Studios sued Sony for copyright infringement based on 
Sony’s customers using Betamax to record Universal Studios’ 
televised copyrighted broadcasts, and Sony raised a “fair use” 
defense.20 The district court held in favor of Sony, but the appellate 
court reversed.21 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and 
reversed the appellate court’s decision, holding for Sony.22 
The Supreme Court appeared to put the most emphasis on the 
first factor (purpose).23 Most notably, the Court addressed the fact 
that the primary use for the Betamax tapes was private home use, 
which “must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit 
activity.24 Because the purpose was for private, personal viewing in 
one’s home at a later time, the Court felt there was a presumption 
                                                
 13 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55. 
 14 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-68. 
 15 See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1521-27. 
 16 Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55. 
 17 Betamax was a home video tape recorder produced by Sony. Id. at 422. 
 18 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55. 
 19 Id. at 419. 
 20 Id. at 420, 424. 
 21 Id. at 420. 
 22 Id. at 421. 
 23 Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. 
 24 Id. 
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of fairness in the use.25 Additionally, the Court’s decision was 
based on the fact that because the nature of the public broadcasts 
invited those customers to watch the programs in their entirety free 
of charge, it had no demonstrable effect on Universal’s potential 
market.26 
Just one year later, in Harper & Row,27 the Supreme Court held 
that The Nation’s (“Nation”) verbatim copying of excerpts from 
former President Ford’s unpublished memoirs did not constitute 
fair use.28 Instead, the Court placed the weight of its decision on 
the fourth statutory factor (market effect), followed respectively by 
the third (amount) and second (nature).29 Nation was a magazine 
that had originally received the rights from Ford to license 
prepublication excerpts from his memoirs and in turn negotiated 
with Time Magazine for the opportunity for Time to publish those 
excerpts.30 
After negotiations, Nation obtained a leaked copy of the 
memoir and published a piece containing an excerpt of some 300-
400 words comprising verbatim quotes from the manuscript.31 
Nation released the article just before the Time article was 
supposed to print, “scooping”32 the Time article.33 As a result, Time 
refused to pay the remaining balance negotiated for the excerpts.34 
Nation sued to recover the balance, but the district court held for 
Time, stating that a copyright protected the Ford memoirs, and 
Nation infringed upon that copyright.35 The court of appeals 
                                                
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 450. 
 27 See Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-68 (1985). 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Id. at 542-53.   
 31 Id. at 543, 548. 
 32 Id. at 542 (implying that “scooping” means to take the newsworthiness of 
the information away from the Time article, rendering it less impactful and thus 
potentially reducing marketability of the article). 
 33 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543. 
 34 See id. at 543. 
 35 Id. at 543-44. 
DEC 2016] Oracle v. Google 7 
reversed, stating that Nation’s publication was “fair use,” but the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed that holding.36 
Contrary to the Sony case, the Court in Harper & Row, held 
“[the fourth] factor is undoubtedly the single most important 
element of ‘fair use,’”37 because, to be applied properly, fair use 
must be “limited to copying by others which does not materially 
impair the marketability of the work which is copied.”38 Like in the 
Sony case, a showing of adverse effect on the potential market 
could negate the “fair use.”39 The Court reasoned that the relevant 
market in this case was to be the first to release new information 
on Ford, which is what Time intended to do.40 Nation’s publishing 
of the excerpts before Time, which could be recognized as Ford 
speaking and not Nation,41 “directly competed for a share of the 
market for prepublication excerpts.”42 
For the third and second factors, ordered according to the 
weight given to them by the Court, the focus was on the qualitative 
amount of copyrighted work used, rather than the quantitative 
amount,43 and the nature of that work.44 Nation verbatim published 
a small quantitative amount of the manuscript, but captured “what 
was essentially the heart” of the work.45 An editor of Time stated 
that the chapters quoted were “the most interesting and moving 
parts of the entire manuscript” and were “the most powerful 
passages in those chapters.”46 The Court noted that “[t]he fact that 
                                                
 36 Id. at 542, 544. 
 37 Id. at 566. 
 38 Id. at 566-567 (quoting Melvill B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright, § 1.10[D] at 1-87 (Rev. Ed. 2011)). 
 39 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. 
 40 Id. at 603. 
 41 Id. at 568. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 565. 
 44 See id. at 563. 
 45 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting Harper & Row, Publrs. v. 
Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 46 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565. 
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a work is unpublished is a critical element of its ‘nature,’” and that 
the scope of “fair use” should be narrowed in such cases.47  
The Supreme Court’s position on the importance of each of the 
factors appears ambiguous, offering little guidance to lower courts. 
The Ninth Circuit confirmed this ambiguity in Sega v. Accolade,48 
choosing to emphasize different statutory factors. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Fair Use Interpretations 
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s breaking down 
of Sega programming was fair use.49 The Ninth Circuit followed 
the Supreme Court in Sony, putting the most weight on the first 
statutory factor (purpose), followed by the fourth factor (market 
effect), but went its own way by focusing additionally on the 
second factor (nature).50 Accolade was attempting to manufacture 
video games for various game consoles, but wanted compatibility 
with the Sega Genesis system.51 To determine the compatibility 
requirements, Accolade disassembled Sega video game software to 
find the code needed for compatibility.52 It then copied the code 
necessary for compatibility, but wrote its own procedures and 
developed its own games.53 Sega sued for copyright infringement 
of its code.54 The district court found for Sega, but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, saying Accolade’s use of the code was “fair 
use.”55 
The Ninth Circuit put a lot of weight on whether the use was 
for commercial purposes.56 However, instead of looking at the 
ultimate result of Accolade developing games to sell that were 
compatible with the Genesis system, the court focused on 
                                                
 47 Id. at 564. 
 48 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-27 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 49 See id. at 1527. 
 50 See id. at 1521-27. 
 51 Id. at 1514. 
 52 Id. at 1514-15. 
 53 Id. at 1515. 
 54 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1516. 
 55 See id. at 1517, 1527-28. 
 56 See id. at 1522. 
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Accolade’s narrowed purpose of seeking to understand the 
functional requirements of the Genesis system.57 Because this was 
an educational purpose, the court concluded that Accolade’s use 
was “for a legitimate, essentially non-exploitative purpose” and 
could thus be described as being of “minimal significance” 
commercially.58 The court then tied the purpose and character to 
the fourth factor: the effect on the potential market.59 
No significant effect on the market was found in Sega because, 
unlike in Harper & Row, Accolade was not attempting to “scoop” 
Sega’s release of particular video games.60 Rather, Accolade 
wanted to break into the market for Genesis-compatible video 
games.61 The nature of video games is such that the purchasing of 
one game of a specific type does not preclude the same consumer 
from also purchasing a different game of the same or similar type.62 
The court used a test63 from the Second Circuit to boil the nature of 
the code down to the core ideas of the program to determine that 
the copied code was mostly functional elements, weighing in favor 
of fair use.64 
The weight and focus of each statutory factor will differ 
depending on the specifics of the case at bar, but it appears to be 
possible for a court to place greater weight on one factor over 
others. An appeal to the Federal Circuit could introduce the 
possibility of factor rankings.65 However, in order to address the 
implications of a Federal Circuit decision on “fair use” factors, the 
next section first necessarily explains the technologies at issue in 
Oracle v. Google: Java and Java APIs. 
                                                
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1522-23. 
 59 Id. at 1523. 
 60 See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
63 See infra Part III. Section C.2. 
 64 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-26. 
65 See infra Part V. Section A. 
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III. JAVA 
This section provides a background on Java by (A) explaining 
the substance of Java, (B) describing the structure of Java, and (C) 
demonstrating how copyright law applies to the structure and 
organization of Java. 
A. What is Java? 
Java is a programming language initially developed and owned 
by Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”).66 Like all programming 
languages, Java has a combination of words, symbols, and other 
units arranged according to specified syntax rules to create various 
instructions.67 Generally, this is referred to as source code, the 
version of a program that can be read by humans.68 However, Java 
differs from other programming languages. Instead of the 
computer directly interpreting Java source code into something the 
computer can understand—binary machine code69—Java code is 
first compiled into bytecode70 and then interpreted by a Java 
Virtual Machine (“JVM”).71 The JVM is an executable program on 
the computer that interprets the bytecode into machine code, 
executing specific operations.72 This intermediate step allows the 
Java code to be hardware/platform independent.73 The source code 
                                                
 66 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 67 See id. at 1348; see generally Monica Pawlan, Essentials of the Java 
Programming Language, Part 1, ORACLE (March 1999), 
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/index-138747.html (providing an 
introduction to the Java programming language). 
 68 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1348. 
 69 Binary machine code is a collection of 0s and 1s that form instructions a 
computing device can understand. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1347. 
 70 Bytecode is intermediate, machine-independent, object code that is the 
result of a program compiling the inputted Java source code. See Java Bytecode, 
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/7866/java-bytecode (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2016); see also Bill Venners, Bytecode Basics: A First Look at 
the Bytecodes of the JavaVirtual Machine, JAVAWORLD, (Sep. 1, 1996, 1:00 
AM), http://www.javaworld.com/article/2077233/core-java/bytecode-
basics.html. 
 71 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1348. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. at 1347. 
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and the machine code are both generally “literal elements”74 of a 
computer program.75 
B. The Structure of Java Code 
Programs work by calling specific operations to do different 
tasks, and the codes for those specific operations are called 
“Methods.”76 Those Methods, along with variables and other 
elements on which the methods operate, make up different 
“Classes.”77 At the broadest level, those Classes are organized into 
“Packages.”78 There are two components to Packages: the 
declaring code and the implementing code.79 The APIs at issue in 
the Oracle v. Google case are Packages, the high-level, general 
pieces of code.80 The district court analogized the structure as 
follows: “Oracle’s collection of API packages is like a library, 
each package is like a bookshelf in the library, each class is like a 
book on the shelf, and each method is like a how-to chapter in a 
book.”81 To continue the analogy, the declaring code would be like 
the title of that how-to chapter, and the implementing code would 
be the text of the chapter. This is the APIs’ SSO, and it is 
considered a “non-literal element”82 of a computer program.83 
APIs allow Java programmers to use prewritten programs to 
build functions into their own Java applications, rather than having 
to start over from scratch.84 As stated above, APIs consist of 
                                                
74 See infra Part III. Section C.1. 
 75 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355. 
 76 See id. at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing Methods under 
Lesson 2: Building Applications). 
 77 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing 
Classes under Lesson 2: Building Applications). 
 78 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing 
Packages under Lesson 2: Building Applications). 
 79 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349. 
 80 See Google’s Trial Brief at 1, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-10-
03561 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016). 
 81 Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349. 
82 See infra Part III. Section C.2. 
 83 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355-56. 
 84 Id. at 1349. 
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declaring code and implementing code.85 The declaring code 
identifies the method body and specifies inputs, names, and other 
functionalities. For example, using the declaration “public static int 
max(int x, int y)” signals the objective of returning the maximum 
of x and y indicated between the parentheses.86 The code that 
actually calculates the maximum value and returns it is called the 
implementing code.87 The parties in Oracle v. Google are 
specifically arguing about whether Google’s use of the declaring 
code and SSO of the Java APIs was fair.88 
C. Copyright Law and Java 
This section addresses how copyright law applies to (1) literal 
elements, and (2) non-literal elements of computer programs. 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection exists in 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,” including literary works.89 Copyright protection does 
not, however, exist for “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”90 This 
means the law protects the expression itself, rather than the 
underlying idea.91 So for a particular program component to be 
protected, it must qualify as an expression of an idea, not the idea 
itself.92 If the expression of an idea were inseparable from the idea 
                                                
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. (indicating that “public” shows a general accessibility of the method, 
“static” means the method can be called at any time, and “int” signifies the 
method will return an integer). 
 87 See id. at 1350. 
 88 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 8. 
 89 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). 
 90 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 91 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1354. 
 92 See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys. 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 
(9th Cir. 1989). For example, a “jeweled bee pin” would be an idea, and actually 
creating a specific jeweled bee pin would be an expression of that idea. See 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971). The line between an idea and an expression is not always easy to draw. 
See id. (“The critical distinction between ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ is difficult to 
draw. As Judge Hand candidly wrote, ‘Obviously, no principle can be stated as 
to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its 
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itself—perhaps due to a limited number of ways to properly 
express the idea—then the expression would not benefit from 
copyright protection.93 
1. Literal Elements 
Although it is generally understood that copyright protection 
does not apply to names, titles, or short phrases,94 courts have 
consistently held that copyright protection can apply to literal 
elements of a computer program.95 In many cases, there are 
numerous ways to write programs and different names for a 
declaration.96 The various options demonstrate creativity in 
choosing which declaration or specific method for executing a 
program, qualifying those literal elements as expressions and 
permitting them copyright protection.97 
2. Non-literal Elements 
Partly for reasons similar to the literal elements above, courts 
have construed SSOs as expressions and granted them copyright 
protection.98 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit endorsed a three-step 
                                                                                                         
“expression.”’”) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
 93 See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 94 See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular 34, COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, or SHORT PHRASES (Oct. 
2015). 
 95 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355; see also Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 
F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175; Apple, 725 
F.2d at 525. 
 96 See Apple, 725 F.2d at 525. When deciding copyrightability of declaration 
codes, the Federal Circuit stated: “The [district court] failed to recognize, 
however, that the relevant question for copyrightability purposes is not whether 
the work at issue contains short phrases—as literary works often do—but, 
rather, whether those phrases are creative.” See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1362. The 
analysis here presented by the court is too formalistic for the field of computer 
sciences, as it fails to consider the commonplace of certain declaration codes 
within the field. But, copyrightability of APIs is for another court at another 
time. 
 97 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356; see also Apple, 725 F.2d at 525. 
 98 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355; see also Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175. 
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test developed by the Second Circuit and adopted by several 
circuits as another way to determine if non-literal elements are 
expressions.99 The test is called an “abstraction-filtration-
comparison” test (“AFC test”), and it rejects both the “notion that 
anything that performs a function is necessarily uncopyrightable” 
and the notion that “once any separable idea can be identified in a 
computer program everything else must be protectable expression, 
on grounds that more than one idea may be embodied.”100 The test 
is as follows: 
In the abstraction step, the court “first breaks down the 
allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts.”101 
In the filtration step, the court “sifts out all non-protectable 
material,” including ideas and “expression that is necessarily 
incidental to those ideas.”102 In the final step, the court compares 
the remaining creative expression with the allegedly infringing 
program.103 
In one swoop, this test addresses both a copyrightability 
analysis and an infringement analysis.104 The next section describes 
the role of literal and non-literal elements in the copyright 
infringement case brought by Oracle against Google for Google’s 
use of Java APIs.105 
IV. ORACLE V. GOOGLE: HISTORY AND HOLDINGS 
This part introduces the history of the Oracle v. Google case by 
discussing (A) what led to the initial case, (B) the district court and 
Federal Circuit’s rulings in the initial case, and (C) the district 
court’s ruling upon remand. 
                                                
 99 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1357. 
 100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
 103 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 
693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 104 Id. at 1357. 
105 See supra Part III. Section B. for an explanation of Java APIs. 
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A. Leading up to the Initial Oracle v. Google Case 
In 2005, Google acquired Android Industries with the intent of 
developing the Android mobile OS.106 Google initially tried to 
license the use of Java from Sun, but negotiations eventually fell 
through.107 Google continued to develop Android with the 
assistance of Open Handset Alliance (“OHA”), using freely 
available Java language and other open source materials.108 Google 
created a three-layered system, which runs the Android OS, 
utilizing open source code from existing sources, including Java 
language API libraries available from the Apache Software 
Foundation.109 
The bottom layer of Google’s system—the core operating 
system—utilizes the open source Linux kernel.110 For the middle 
layer, Google developed its own virtual machine—“Dalvik”—to 
execute programs in Java and other languages.111 The upper layer 
consisted of API packages.112 Google wrote over one hundred of its 
own API packages, but also used thirty-seven Java APIs relevant 
to a smartphone platform for the Android OS.113 Google copied the 
declaring code for those APIs verbatim, in order to allow 
application developers to find those functionalities by the same 
names used in Java within the Android OS.114 
While Google admitted to copying the declaring code for the 
APIs and the SSO of the packages reflected in the declaring 
code,115 it “re-implemented” the APIs by writing and utilizing its 
                                                
 106 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 2. 
 107 See id. at 3-4. 
 108 See id. at 4. 
 109 See id. at 4-5. 
 110 See id. at 5. The Linux kernel is the core of the Linux operating system, an 
open source operating system developed by Linus Torvald. See Kernel 
Definition, THE LINUX INFORMATION PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/kernel.html 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2016); see also Linux Definition, THE LINUX INFORMATION 
PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/linuxdef.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
 111 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 5. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 5. 
 114 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1339, 1350-51. 
 115 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 8. 
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own implementing code.116 In 2010, Oracle purchased Sun, and 
almost immediately sued Google for copyright infringement based 
on Android’s use of the thirty-seven Java APIs.117 Oracle was 
asserting a patent infringement claim and copyright infringement 
for the method declarations (literal elements) and SSO (non-literal 
elements) of those API packages.118 
B. District Court and Federal Circuit Results of the Initial  
Oracle v. Google Case 
The district court originally found no patent infringement and 
held that APIs were not subject to copyright protection,119 but the 
jury hung on Google’s fair use defense.120 The district court 
concluded that the declaring code was uncopyrightable because it 
employed short phrases, the idea and expression merged, and the 
SSO was uncopyrightable as a “method of operation” under 
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act.121 Because the jury was unable to 
reach a conclusion on the fair use defense, the court never 
performed any fact finding on the defense for final judgment.122 
Oracle appealed the district court’s decision to the Federal 
Circuit.123 The decision was appealed to the Federal Circuit 
because of the patent infringement claim, although Ninth Circuit 
law governed the copyright claim.124 
After de novo review,125 the Federal Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s decision, holding that the declaring method and SSO of the 
                                                
 116 See id. at 5. 
 117 See id. at 6-7. 
 118 See id. at 7. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id. at 1352. 
 121 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1359. 
 122 Id. at 1377. 
 123 Id. at 1359. 
 124 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2015); see also Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353. 
 125 The standard of review was de novo because “‘[f]air use is a mixed 
question of law and fact.’ Thus, while . . . findings of fact must be reviewed for 
clear error under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ninth 
Circuit reviews the ultimate application of those facts de novo.” Oracle, 750 
F.3d at 1373 (citations omitted). 
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thirty-seven APIs were subject to copyright protection.126 Because 
the district court never did any fact-finding on the fair use defense, 
the Federal Circuit remanded the case back down to the district 
court to decide on the fair use of the thirty-seven APIs according to 
the Federal Circuit’s ruling that the APIs are copyrightable.127 
Google filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, but was 
ultimately denied and forced to return to the District Court for the 
Northern District of California for a new trial.128 
C. District Court Results from the Remanded Oracle v. Google 
Case 
Upon remand, Google once again raised a fair use defense 
against Oracle’s copyright infringement claims, for which Oracle 
was seeking $8.8 billion in damages from profits Oracle claimed 
Google made from Android.129 The next section130 discusses the 
district court’s interpretations of each of the fair use elements laid 
out above.131 To the entertainment of those in attendance,132 each 
                                                
 126 See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353, 1367. 
 127 Id. at 1377. 
 128 See Google, Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4472 (2015). 
 129 Joe Mullin, Second Oracle v. Google Trial Could Lead to Huge Headaches 
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 130 See infra Part V. Section A.1. 
 131 See supra Part II. 
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insistent that Java APIs are a creative work (9:09 AM 
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have brought LITERAL PHYSICAL FILE CABINETS as visual aids to explain 
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side presented their case, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Google, concluding that Google’s use of the thirty-seven Java APIs 
and their SSOs constituted fair use.133 
Oracle has filed an appeal of the verdict to the Federal 
Circuit.134 As noted above,135 the next part will attempt to analyze 
two potentially significant outcomes of that appeal and the 
consequences that could result from each. 
V. RULING IMPLICATIONS 
This part addresses the implications of a Federal Circuit ruling 
by analyzing (A) potential consequences of an affirmation of the 
District Court’s ruling on Google’s fair use and alternatively, (B) 
potential consequences of a reversal of the District Court’s ruling 
on Google’s fair use of the Java APIs. 
A. What Affirming the Current Ruling Could Mean 
To understand what an affirmation of the jury verdict by the 
Federal Circuit could mean, it is important to address the outcome 
of the jury trial. As mentioned above, the jury found in favor of 
                                                                                                         
what an API is (9:56 AM, 
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730079061293195264) . . . he literally 
opened the top drawer and pulled something out and waved it around to explain 
(9:57 AM, https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730079061293195264)” Sarah 
Jeong, @sarahjeong, TWITTER (May 10, 2016); “Oracle attorney is in for the 
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on it as a REAL example of fair use” (9:00 AM, 
https://twitter.com/xor/status/730064881852907520); “Judge Alsup just had to 
read a dozen Android version names in the jury instructions. Some day you gotta 
hear a federal judge list desserts.” (10:23 AM, 
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TWITTER (May 10, 2016). 
 133 See Final Judgment, supra note 4. 
 134 Notice of Appeal to the Fed. Cir. by Oracle Am., Inc, No. 3:10-cv-03561, 
entry # 2071, filed on 10/26/2016, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3183383/e159d3de-ee97-4d07-
92df-db808e4a43c5.txt. 
 135 See supra Part I. 
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Google.136 Jury deliberations are secret, but looking at how Judge 
Alsup presented the case and the law to the jury provides an 
understanding of the current ruling. This section proceeds by (1) 
describing more specifically the current interpretations of the 
statutory factors as charged to the jury and (2) why these 
interpretations should be affirmed. 
1. The Statutory Factors as Charged to the Jury 
While it is impossible to know exactly how the jury weighed 
each fair use statutory factor, Judge Alsup’s137 instructions to the 
jury in the district court show how he felt the four factors should 
be weighed.138 According to Judge Alsup, the fourth statutory 
factor (market effect) is the “single most important statutory 
factor,”139 followed by the first (purpose) and then third (amount) 
factors.140 This is yet again a different order from the cases 
above.141 However, what is significant about Judge Alsup’s 
interpretation of each of the factors is that they appear to be a 
liberal and lenient application of copyright law for software 
development142 that are more in line with the goal of the fair use 
doctrine to foster innovation.143 This application is something the 
Federal Circuit has the potential to reinforce and continue, if not 
expand. Additionally, the Federal Circuit could also set a trend for 
the general order of importance for each of the four statutory 
factors. 
                                                
 136 See supra Part IV. Section C. 
 137 Judge Alsup is the District Court judge who presided over the initial 
Oracle v. Google case as well as the remanded case. 
 138 See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 12-19. 
 139 Id. at 18. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See supra Part II. 
 142 See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 18; see also infra Part V. Section A.2. 
 143 See Richard Stim, What Is Fair Use?, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES: 
COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-
fair-use/(last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (noting that the rationale behind the fair use 
doctrine is to allow the public to benefit from the improvement of the 
copyrighted work). 
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Like the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Alsup believed the 
fourth factor to be the “single most important statutory factor” but 
noted it is “not necessarily dispositive” and “must be weighed with 
all other factors.”144 The analysis must consider the extent to which 
the accused work can be a substitute or replacement for the 
copyrighted work, as well as the likelihood of future market 
harm.145 For this factor to weigh in favor of fair use, the accused 
work should not “materially impair[] the marketability or value of 
the copyrighted work.”146 
For the first factor (purpose), Judge Alsup appeared to focus 
most on the transformative nature of the use rather than if the use 
was commercial.147 He conceded that whether the use was 
commercial is also an element of the factor, but noted all parties 
agreed the purpose of the use was commercial.148 Judge Alsup was 
very liberal in his definition of “transformative.”149 While he stated 
the use must add something new, Judge Alsup defined the term 
transformative to include using the copyrighted work in a different 
context without being required to change the elements in any other 
way.150 
Again, like the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, for the third 
factor (amount), Judge Alsup put emphasis on the qualitative 
amount of copyrighted work used rather than the quantitative 
                                                
 144 See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 18. 
 145 Id. at 18-19. 
 146 Id. at 18. 
 147 See id. at 14. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. at 13-14. 
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amount, even concluding “the total number of lines [of code] in 
Android is irrelevant.”151 He went further, allowing some wiggle 
room for qualitative copying, but only to the extent that it would 
facilitate a transformative use and that the extent related to the 
purpose and character of use in the first statutory factor 
(purpose).152 
While he appeared to emphasize least on the second statutory 
factor (nature), Judge Alsup followed an interpretation similar to 
that of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.153 The jury 
instructions insinuated that the jury should apply the AFC test, 
which implied juror analysis should hinge on whether the work is 
creative or functional, with functional weighing in favor of fair 
use.154 
2. Why the Charged Interpretations Should Be Affirmed 
The Federal Circuit should affirm Judge Alsup’s interpretation 
and application of the statutory factors for two main reasons. First, 
under Judge Alsup’s interpretations set out in the jury instructions, 
the law would be more lenient and favorable to programmers, 
focusing more on a functional rather than formal analysis. A 
functional analysis allows for flexibility in characterization—
accounting for realities in the field—whereas a formal analysis is 
more likely to adhere to the letter of the law. Computer 
programming is dynamic in nature, as evidenced by the number of 
open source projects running on sites like GitHub.155 The 
                                                
 151 See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 17. 
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 153 Sega Enters. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th 1992). 
 154 See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 15-16. 
 155 See Open Source, GITHUB, https://github.com/open-source (last visited Oct 
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instructions appear to demonstrate that Google’s use of the Java 
APIs aligns with the collaborative, functional nature of software 
development.156 Second, initiating a trend of consistency could lead 
to results that are more predictable and subsequently, a better 
understanding of how copyright law should be applied to software 
code. 
For this case, Google argued that its actions had no bearing on 
Oracle’s market for Java, but rather, that any failures were 
“attributable to [Oracle’s] own actions or inaction . . . .”157 On 
multiple occasions, Oracle and Sun both failed to adopt Java for 
mobile devices—at times due to insufficient functionality—even 
utilizing the same APIs at issue in this case.158 Additionally, 
Google argued that the evidence showed that not only did using its 
own implementing code for the thirty-seven Java APIs change 
elements of the copyrighted work, but it also put the APIs into a 
different context.159 This was transformative, even according to 
Oracle’s own employees.160 
Furthermore, Google noted that the nature of its use of the 
declaring code and SSO was mainly functional, stating “[the 
APIs’] predominant purpose is simply to allow access to the pre-
written code in the API packages and thereby allow for the 
practical use of the Java programming language.”161 Demonstrating 
the functionality of the code, Google stated that “[the thirty-seven] 
Java . . . API packages and their organization are . . . oftentimes 
needed to make practical use of the Java programming 
language.”162 To give further evidence in favor of the nature of the 
copyrighted work, Google addressed the fact that Sun made Java 
available under a free open source license,163 which “permitted 
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 157 See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 1, 10. 
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licensees to subset or superset the Java . . . API packages, thereby 
enabling exactly the sort of fragmentation that [Oracle] claims to 
be damaged by.”164 
Google’s arguments appear to fit well into the statutory 
interpretations laid out by Judge Alsup in his instructions to the 
jury.165 For factor four (market effect), Google and Judge Alsup 
both have a common understanding that the market effect relates to 
the manner in which the copyrighted material was used.166 Google 
used the Java APIs for a mobile OS, and Oracle did not have a 
mobile OS,167 thus there was no market for Google’s use to affect. 
This is a pragmatic approach to looking at market effect, as 
opposed to Oracle’s formal approach.168 In calculating damages for 
harm, Oracle attempted to include everything the Java code was 
involved in.169 
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performed on an Android phone. See id. at 12. This calculation was done 
without any supporting evidence or analysis demonstrating that the thirty-seven 
APIs in question caused or enabled any of the profit streams above. See id. Mr. 
 
24 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
For factor one (purpose), again Judge Alsup and Google were 
on the same page, honing in on the transformative nature, rather 
than the commercial nature of the use.170 While it behooved Google 
to direct attention away from the commercial nature of the use, an 
interpretation of factor one that is more focused on the 
transformative nature could reward innovation, permitting the 
public to benefit from technological advancements that may utilize 
building blocks like the declaring codes of the Java APIs. After all, 
it is with the use of those Java APIs that Google was able to 
develop Android, which currently dominates the smartphone OS 
market.171 
The pattern of parallel thinking between Judge Alsup and 
Google continued with factor two, which addressed the nature of 
the work.172 When certain APIs and SSOs are required for practical 
use, it would inhibit progress to prevent usage of those necessary 
elements. Additionally, when the code is released to the general 
public for use following a relatively unrestricted open-source 
license, the code, and subsequently Google’s use of that code, 
comports with the collaborative nature of the software industry and 
the functional interpretation set out by Judge Alsup. 
Google, Judge Alsup, and the jury all appear to understand that 
the purpose of a fair use defense is to promote technological 
innovation. There is, however, no guarantee that the Federal 
Circuit will set any standards according to Judge Alsup’s 
interpretations of the statutory factors. There is not even a 
guarantee that the Federal Circuit will not reverse the jury verdict. 
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Reversing the jury verdict could have detrimental effects for both 
copyright law and the fair use test, as well as for the software field. 
B. What Reversing the Verdict Could Mean 
Having addressed the district court’s interpretations of the 
statutory factors and why the Federal Circuit should affirm the 
jury’s verdict,173 it is necessary to now examine the potential 
consequences of the alternative result of Oracle’s appeal. This 
section theorizes possible outcomes of a reversal by the Federal 
Circuit of the district court’s verdict, focusing on (1) how it may 
affect copyright law and (2) how it may affect the software 
industry. 
1. Effect on Copyright Law 
It is necessary to first address the precedential impact of a 
reversal. The Federal Circuit’s decision may end up having a low 
precedential impact because the Federal Circuit is not the court that 
would normally hear a copyright case.174 As stated above,175 this 
case only went to the Federal Circuit because there was a patent 
infringement claim initially involved, and the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction for appeals of patent cases.176 Additionally, 
the Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit law.177 Because the 
Federal Circuit is neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court, 
it does not have the final say on how to interpret Ninth Circuit law. 
There may be minimal change in how the law is actually 
interpreted and applied. To start with, the outcome of the appeal 
                                                
 173 See supra Part V. Section A. 
 174 Unless brought before the United States Court of Federal Claims—which 
does get appealed to the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3)—a 
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will not affect the copyrightability of the literal and non-literal 
elements of APIs because the Federal Circuit’s determination on 
that matter stands and will not be overturned.178 Because APIs will 
still be copyrightable until a court with binding authority (the 
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court in this case) says otherwise, 
that is the way copyrightability must be interpreted.179 Due to the 
potentially low binding or persuasive authority of the Federal 
Circuit, a case before the Ninth Circuit on the copyrightability of 
APIs could overturn the Federal Circuit’s decision with respect to 
the Ninth Circuit, rendering any discussion stemming from this 
case relatively moot. 
Additionally, the scope of the case is narrow—focusing only 
on whether Google’s use of the declaring code and SSO of the Java 
APIs was fair.180 Because a fair use defense is fact dependent, a 
reversal in this case may simply mean that under these particular 
facts, the Federal Circuit did not believe that Google’s use of the 
Java APIs was fair. A reversal would not inherently invalidate 
another entity’s use of the Java APIs, or any APIs in general. 
Furthermore, there may not be any increased risk of litigation. 
Again, a reversal would not be saying that no actor would have a 
fair use defense for use of APIs, only that Google did not. Actors 
copying implementing code, declaring code, or SSOs of APIs 
could still be subject to copyright infringement claims, just as they 
could be now. Larger, more commercialized actors will still need 
to tread carefully with regard to their use of such code, and may 
only have a marginally larger target on their back due to a 
potentially perceived boost this case could give to a plaintiff’s 
complaint. On the other hand, smaller actors and average users 
may not actually feel any additional pressure from larger 
companies. This is not to say that the smaller actors would not face 
any litigation risk, but rather that they may not be at any greater 
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risk from larger companies than they already are because the cost 
of litigation may outweigh the recovery. 
To the extent its opinion would be binding or persuasive, the 
Federal Circuit could have the potential to negatively shape 
copyright law as it applies to software. Regardless of whether the 
Federal Circuit reverses the jury verdict or not, it will likely lay out 
an interpretation of the four statutory factors of fair use doctrine, as 
appellate courts generally do when presented with a test. It is 
possible the Federal Circuit’s interpretations could line up with 
those of Judge Alsup, but find that the evidence in the record 
points in a different direction. However, it is equally likely that the 
Federal Circuit could focus on and give different weight to other 
factors that do not line up with those emphasized by Judge 
Alsup.181 
On the other hand, a possible consequence of the Federal 
Circuit developing its own factor interpretations is that it could 
restrict what constitutes fair use, strengthening copyright law. This 
could result in analytically bad law. Concerning technology, 
analytically bad law is law that would seem to comport with 
statutory language, but is largely impractical in real world 
application.182 It would contradict how the field it is governing 
actually functions.183 
For example, a shift from analyzing the first statutory factor 
based on a transformative nature to focusing solely on whether a 
use is commercial could have a strong negative impact on 
innovation. In the technology world, the big name companies are 
commonly the ones with the most money to spend on 
advancements and innovations. They have the most money, in part, 
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because they are commercializing at least some of their work 
product. Focusing on whether a use was commercial rather than 
how transformative that use may have been disregards potential 
benefits the public might gain from the improvement. It is 
relatively easy to classify work product coming out of a larger 
company like Google as commercial, because they are a business, 
and have shareholders and investors to whom they answer. In the 
2012 trial, Google stated that “[n]obody is claiming that Google 
created Android as part of a charitable mission. The evidence is 
pretty clear that they created it to provide a platform on which 
other Google products could do better.”184 However, there are 
technological benefits to such development, as demonstrated by 
Android’s market dominance.185 Performing a more formal analysis 
that focuses on the commercial aspect as Oracle implored,186 rather 
than looking at the transformative nature of the disputed work, 
provides an easily checked box against the defendant regardless of 
societal gains. 
It is difficult to predict how the Federal Circuit may interpret 
the different statutory factors upon review or if that ruling will 
have any influence on other courts. However, to the extent the 
Federal Circuit offers different interpretations and other courts are 
influenced by the Federal Circuit’s decision, shifting 
interpretations toward example above could lead to real world 
consequences, such as a debilitating effect on the software 
industry. 
2. Effect on the Software Industry 
Other than the law becoming outdated and more stringent, 
consequences of a reversal of the jury verdict could include a 
debilitated software industry and diminished innovation. When the 
Federal Circuit first decided that APIs were copyrightable, the 
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software industry was confused.187 The notion of copyrighting non-
literal elements and literal elements like method declaration did not 
correspond with the general expectations of developers.188 Most 
developers wrote code for others in the industry to use, furthering 
collaboration and technological progress.189 Suddenly, the Federal 
Circuit had put a potential limitation on that collaboration and 
progress.190 A reversal by the Federal Circuit of the jury verdict on 
fair use could magnify that confusion and uncertainty. 
In some ways, the outcome of an appeal to the Federal Circuit 
will have little to no bearing on the software world. Damage was 
done with the first appeal to the Federal Circuit, in which the court 
held declaring code and SSOs of APIs were copyrightable.191 As 
stated above, an appeal of the fair use defense is not going to 
change that fact, so developers will still have to be cognizant of 
that for now. Additionally, as stated above, the independent 
developers and collaborative teams are unlikely to feel any 
litigation pressure, at least from powerhouses like Oracle, who are 
only seeking big damages. 
However, a reversal may, to the detriment of independent and 
smaller developers, provide an environment for bad-faith 
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opportunists to take advantage of the industry.192 This environment 
would most likely be the result of a more formalistic interpretation 
of the statutory factors for a fair use defense. As mentioned above, 
a formalistic approach can, in some cases, provide easily checked 
boxes for plaintiffs. While it may not be certain that a decision by 
the Federal Circuit would have any precedential influence to a 
court, that precedent is not necessarily required for those bad-faith 
opportunists to be successful; the presence of those easy-to-check 
boxes may be all the ammunition needed. A potential market for 
copyright trolls193 and licensing businesses could grow from 
weakened fair use defenses and strict enforcement of copyrights of 
things like declaring codes and SSOs.194 
These licensing businesses would most likely behave like 
patent trolls, which are non-practicing entities that buy up patent 
portfolios, and as with copyright trolls, their sole aim is to find 
people to sue for infringement and make money on subsequent 
settlements.195 Unwitting independent developers and users, who 
might not even know they needed a license, could be subjected to 
strong-armed licensing agreements to avoid being taken to court. If 
those users or developers are not legally sophisticated they may not 
know that the Federal Circuit’s opinion could potentially have little 
weight at trial. At the same time, regardless of sophistication and 
being taken advantage of, they may want to avoid the costs, time, 
and effort associated with trials. 
To shield themselves and downstream recipients from 
copyright trolls, independent and smaller developers who intended 
their programs and modifications to be freely distributed and used 
may need to do extra work. Developers who want their programs 
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to be freely used would need to go back through their work and 
ensure that any technology, such as declaring code and SSOs of 
APIs, are wholly their own, or are appropriately licensed under a 
proprietary or open-source license.196 Additionally, the developers 
would need to publicly announce inclusion of the licenses in their 
code so the downstream users would know of the license 
requirements.197 This can be an insurmountable task. For example, 
one site that hosts open-source programming projects is GitHub.198 
GitHub allows for free collaboration on any number of projects, 
and there are millions of projects hosted.199 A single developer 
could have contributed to any number of projects, which would 
require a search through each line of code in each project to verify 
the correct license is attached. Such an undertaking could be 
impracticable. 
Additionally, the work-around requirements for those software 
programs that utilize Java APIs could be substantially detrimental 
to interoperability.200 New methods may need to be developed and 
redistributed to get those utilizing Java APIs back to the level of 
compatibility and efficiency at which development is currently 
operating.201 Java took at least four years from its conception to 
break through into the public spotlight and had been continuing to 
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grow for a total of fifteen years by the time Google began to 
develop the Android OS.202 While technological growth has been 
increasing annually, there is still the potential for a heavy workload 
to return to the level of interoperability that Java provided. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current state of software copyright law is murky, but the 
Federal Circuit has an opportunity to clear things up. There are 
potential benefits should the Federal Circuit affirm the jury verdict. 
An affirmation could result in continued, if not more, lenient 
interpretations of the statutory factors, employing a functional—
rather than formalistic—analysis. This would create copyright law 
that focuses more on permitting innovation. Additionally, an 
affirmation could initiate a potential order of importance of those 
statutory factors. Because of these benefits, as well as the evidence 
presented by Google, the Federal Circuit should affirm the District 
Court’s ruling. 
A reversal, however, could go either way with respect to legal 
effects. There could be no major legal effects due to the potentially 
low precedential influence the Federal Circuit has on other courts. 
Although less likely, the decision could also be detrimental in 
prompting a stricter, more formalistic approach to fair use. 
Regardless of the precedent the Federal Circuit may or may not set 
for other courts, there still could be damaging effects to the 
software industry, where reality and practice can be independent of 
a court’s interpretation of certain laws. Copyright trolls, 
widespread uncertainty, and diminished innovation could befall the 
industry as a result of ambiguity created by a reversal of the district 
court’s holding. These are harms that should be recognized as 
being bigger than the case itself. Their potential impact on the 
industry should outweigh what Oracle hopes to gain in a victory 
over Google. The Federal Circuit has the opportunity to set a 
positive example, and it should take that opportunity, rather than 
handicapping an entire industry. 
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